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Resolving the International Debt Crisis
ABSTRACT
Since August 1982 the international debt crisis has dominated
economic policymaking in the developing countries, economic relations
between the debtor and creditor countries, the attention of the
multilateral institutions in their dealings with the debtor nations,
and private sector decisions on lending to the developing countries.
The period since 1982 has seen some progress. Neither the
commercial nor central banks have had to deal with formal large—scale
debt defaults. Balance sheets of creditor banks have been
strengthened. There is an active secondary market in developing
country debt, and debt to equity swaps are a reality. For the debtors,
real interest rates have fallen between 1982 and 1987. Net exports
showed extraordinary growth.Budget deficits have been reduced
despite falling incomes. In 1987 commodity prices have begun to
recover. The period has seen a shift toward rather than away from
democracy.
But five years after it began, the debt crisis is very much
alive. None of the major Latin American countries has restored normal
access to the international capital markets. At least one major
debtor has been in trouble each year.
Three classes of solutions are described and evaluated.
Least radical are proposals for procedural reform and changes in the
nature of the claims on the existing debt. Some procedural reforms
such as multiyear reschedulings and exit vehicles for smaller banks
have already begun to be instituted. Others include changes in
accounting rules, and U.S. information provision on foreign accounts
held in the U.S. Changes in the nature of claims include debt—equity
swaps, country funds, interest capitalization, and payment by the
debtors in their own currency.
The second type of solution is the creation of a facility, or
new institution to deal with the overhang of existing debt. The
institution would buy the debt from the banks in exchange for claims
on the institution, and in turn collect from the debtor countries.
The prices at which debt is purchased, and the amounts to be collected
from the debtors are the crucial issues. Finally, there are proposals
for debt relief, either in direct negotiation between creditors and







RESOLVING THE INTERNATIONAL DEBT CRISIS
Stanley Fischer
Since it was first recognized in August 1982, the international
debt crisis, has dominated economic policymaking in the developing
countries, economic relations between the debtor and creditor countries,
the attention of the multilateral institutions in their dealings with
the debtor nations, and private sector decisions on lending to the
developing countries.
Developments since 1980 are summarized in Table 1, which
presents data for the Baker fifteen of heavily indebted countries. The
Table 1: ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE, FIFTEEN HEAVILY INDEBTED COUNTRIES.*
1969—791980 1981 1982 198319841985 1986
Per capita 3.6 2.6—1.6 -2.7 —5.5 —0.1 0.9 1.4
real GD? growth
Current account —29.5 —50.3 —50.6 —15.2—0.6—0.1—11.8
(S billion)
Interest pay— 25.1 37.045.541.546.044.038.2
ments (Sbill)
Investmentf 24.7 24.5 22.318.217.416.516.8
GD? (%)
Source: World Economic Outlook. April 1987, Statistical Appendix.
*Countriesare:Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador,
Ivory Coast, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Uruguay,
Venezuela, Yugoslavia.
most significant tact is that the heavily indebted countries suffered
reductions in per capita real GDP averaging ten percent over the period
'Department of Economics, MIT, and Research Associate, NBER. I am
indebted to Geoffrey Carliner, Rudiger Dornbusch and Allan Meltzer for
helpful comments and discussions.2
1981 to 1984, which wiped out most of the gain that had taken place
since the mid—seventies2 .Therewas an extraordinary turnaround in the
current account of the balance of payments which was in balance in 1985
as large trade surpluses were used to pay interest bills of about 5% of
GD?. Improvement in the current account was matched by a decline in
domestic investments implying a fall in net capital formation to half
its previous share of GNP.
Developments on the trade and debt fronts are described in Table
2. Net private capital inflows have virtually disappeared, and even
total capital inflows have been much smaller since 1982 than interest
payments abroad: The most remarkable feature of the debt strategy
Table 2: TRADE AND DEBT DATA, HEAVILY INDEBTED COUNTRIES.
1969—791980 198119821983198419851986
Total external 269.3 330.8 383.1 394.2 410.9 417.2 434.4
debt (Sbill)
Net private borr— 43.257.330.7—2.4 4.2—2.7—7.2
rowing1 (Sbill}
Debt/export 167.1 201.4 269.8 289.7 272.1 284.2 337.9
ratio (%)
Terms—of— 4.4 13.4—2.8 —4.1—3.5 2.2—1.9 —16.1
trade change
(% p.a.)
Non—oil commod.10.0 2.7 —14.1—8.8 6.3 2.5 —10.8 1.5
prices (% p.a.)
Source: World_Economic_Outlook, April 1987, Statistical Appendix.
i Net external borrowing minus long—term borrowing from official
creditors and reserve—related liabilities (short—term borrowing from
foreign monetary authorities, and use of Fund credit).
2There are of course large differences among countries; for instance
Argentina's per capita GDP fell almost 20% from 1981 to 1986, and was
still 10% below its 1975 level, while Brazil's 1986per capita GDP was
above its 1981 level and 20% above the 1975 level.
3Total GD? for the fifteen heavy debtors is in the range 5750—1000
billion.3
followed since 1982 is that the heavily indebted developing countries
have been transferring real resources of close to 5% at their income to
the developed creditor countries. A solution of the debt crisis will
either reverse the direction of this resource flow or at least
significantly reduce it. Despite the virtual cessation of capital
inflows, debt burden indicators, such as the debt to export ratio, have
not improved4: the effects of the increased volume of exports and
decreased volume of imports were offset by a worsening of the terms of
trade.
The picture for the debtors is not entirely bleak. Real
interest rates have fallen between 1982 and 1987. Net exports showed
extraordinary growth.Budget deficits have been reduced despite
falling incomes. In 1987 commodity prices have begun to recover. The
period has seen a shift toward rather than away from democracy.
There has also been very real progress for the creditor banks
and for the international financial system. Most important, neither the
commercial nor central banks have had to deal with large-scale debt
defaults. Balance sheets of creditor banks have been strengthened by
additions to capital and loss reserves in the United States and Europe,
by the weakening of the dollar for those foreign banks that lent in
dollars, and by reductions in foreign exposure. There is an active
secondary market in developing country debt, and debt to equity swaps
are a reality. The optimist (for example, Feldstein, 1987) can take
4The debt to GNP ratio also increased over the period 1982—1986.4
solace in the failure of the worst fears of 1982——that there would be a
worldwide financial crisis-—to eventuate, He can point also to some
successes, such as Korea and other southeast Asian countries, and the
earlier problem case of Turkey.
But the fact remains that five years after it began, the debt
crisis is very much alive. None of the major Latin American countries
has restored normal access to the international capital markets. Even a
country like Colombia, which has rigorously met its payments, finds it
diffi,cult to roll over its debts. At least one major debtor has been in
trouble each year. [n 1987 it is Brazil, whose moratorium could mark
the beginning of a new phase of the crisis.
In its brief life the international debt crisis has generated an
impressive variety of proposed initiatives and solutions.6 Least
radical are proposals for procedural reform and changes in the nature of
the claims on the existing debt. There have been several suggestions
for the creation of a facility, or new institution that would in
specified ways deal with the overhang of existing debt. And finally,
there are proposals for debt relief. I take up these possibilities in
turn in Sections II through IV. Preliminary questions about the nature
of the debt problem and solutions to it are discussed in Section I.
5However the banks quickly moved to limit the system—wide effects of any
unilateral Brazilian decisions by reaching agreements with other major
debtors.
6Dornbusch (1987) ,Feldsteinetal (1987) and Krugman (1986) present
useful surveys of alternative solutions; the classification of debt
initiatives used here is taken from Krugman.S
I. The Meaning of a Solution.
What would it mean for the debt crisis to be resolved? The
simplest criterion is that the debt crisis will finally be over when the
debtor countries have normal access to the international capital
markets. Of course, normal access is itself difficult to define, both
because it is quite normal that not all countries are able to raise
funds on the same terms and that some of them may be credit rationed
because lenders understand that raising interest rates to compensate for
the risk of default may itself increase the probability of default.
More pragmatically, it will be clear that the debt crisis is
moving towards a solution if the net outflow of resources from the
developing debtor countries is significantly reduced, enabling most of
then to run current account deficits. The resource inflows would
finance investment to raise the growth rate and over time move living
standards closer to those of the developed countries.
The assumption that a solution to the debt crisis would reduce
resource flows from the debtors to the creditors is based in part on the
view that investment opportunities in the debtor countries justify
capital inflows. Although investment opportunities appear to warrant
capital inflows in some debtors, such as Brazil, that may not be true of
all debtor countries. Then the case for reducing their net resource
outflows is fairness or the preservation of democracy or capitalism——and
those are obviously both highly important and highly political issues.
Resolution of the debt crisis would enable developing country6
policyrnakers to base policy decisions on longer—term considerations than
their effects on the forthcoming debt negotiations, and it would freeup
for more important purposes policymakers who are now preoccupied with
debt negotiations. The private sector would be able to make investment
plans with less uncertainty about the long term, in particular the
availability of foreign exchange and investment financing.
If the debt crisis were resolved, banks would no longer have to
make loans to developing countries merely to preserve their existing
investments. The banks would eventually be able to reduce their
exposure to the levels they would prefer——and after the experience of
the eighties, these might be very low.
Resolution of the debt crisis would likely also see a change in
the form of international lending. Both lenders and borrowerscan now
see that floating rate financing is a risky way for a country to finance
its long—term development.Very likely, a resolution of the debt
crisis would end with the debtor countries financed through long—term
capital——bonds, equity, direct investment, and perhaps some forms of
long—term indexed debt——rather than floating rate liabilities whose
terms can change overnight.
Resolution of the debt crisis would mean also that the
international institutions, the I!4F and the World Bank, would be able to
get back to their respective goals of promoting international monetary
stability and economic development rather than preventing debt default.
Efficient Solutions.7
The debt crisis involves at least three parties: the debtor
countries, the creditor countries, and the private banks and their
stockholders. A more sophisticated view further distinguishes between
the governments of debtor and creditor countries and their citizens,
between the creditor governments and the international institutions,
between workers in the debtor countries and portfolio holders who
succeeded in moving their capital abroad, and between financial and
manufacturing interests in the developed countries.
A solution to the debt crisis is efficient if it is not possible
to make one of the parties better off without making another party worse
off. There are many efficient solutions, involving tradeoffs among the
interests of the different parties. Although the point is rarely
explicitly recognized, there is no blinking the fact that alternative
solutions imply different burdens for different groups involved in the
crisis. Someone has to pay for past mistakes. It could be the bank
stockholders, creditor country citizens, or citizens of debtor
countries. Or the burden could be shared.
Up to 1987, most of the burden has been borne by wage earners in
the debtor countries. Part has been borne by bank stockholders, who
have seen the value of their shares rise less rapidly than the stock
market as a whole. Some will be borne by the taxpayers of the creditor
countries, as the banks record portfolio losses, lower profits, and
lower taxes. The taxpayers of the creditor countries would pay more of
the burden if their governments or the international institutions were
to provide concessional aid to the debtors. It is of course entirely8
possible that a longer view of the interests of the developed countries
would see benefits rather than burdens for their citizens in the
provision of aid to the debtors——just as it might be possible that the
unconditional provision of aid to their governments would make the
citizens of debtor countries worse off in the long run.
Although the relative burdens are rarely explicitly discussed,
the problem is implicitly recognized by proponents of plans who claim
they are in the best interests of everyone concerned. For instance,
debtor countries are warned not to take unilateral action because future
access to capital markets will be long delayed; or banks are urged to
make concessions that will in the end enable them to collect more rather
than less interest.
Why have the private markets not reached the optimal solution
already? To start with, the underlying transactions were hardly private
market loans in the first place. Many of the loans were made to
governments, who, the lenders believed, simply would not default. Other
loans were taken over from private firms by debtor governments on the
view that default by a domestic firm would spill over to the credit
terms for the country, or to protect domestic borrowers. Further,
creditor governments and central banks were actively encouraging the
recycling of petrodollars and, it might be expected, would support the
banking system if any difficulties arose as a result of the large—scale
foreign lending. Second, governments and governmental organizations——
the 111?, the Fed, the U.S. Treasury and other governments——have been
heavily involved since the crisis began.1Third, there is no single
optimal solution. Solutions differ by who bears the burden.
71t has been argued, for instance by Lindert and Morton in the present
volume, that the debt crisis would have been resolved far more rapidly
without the government intervention.9
But it is likely that improvements that could have been made by
negotiation among the creditors and debtors have already beenachieved.
What remains to he discussed are changes that would shift the burden
among the parties, and improvements that involveexternalities, that is
actions that benefit more than the individuals making the direct
transaction -
Itis conventional in discussing the debt problem to focus on
the restoration of debtor country growth as the ultimate aim. However,
the levels of income and consumption cannot be overlooked. If it can
repress living standards enough, a country can probably putitself in a
position to begin growing again. Figure 1 illustrates. The country has
been growing at a certain rate up to time T, when the debt crisis
strikes. The country has been living beyond its means, and has to
reduce its living standards. By how much? By servicing the debt in
full, it may move onto path A, cutting living standards sharply,
suffering low growth for a while as the economy reallocates resources
from production for domestic use to production for export and import
competition, and then moving ahead. Alternatively the country may,
perhaps through a moratorium, pay a lower price in terms of the initial
reduction in the standard of living and move onto path B, starting at a
higher level of income than on A, and as shown here, growing as fast.
If the growth rates on A and B are the same, and if income on B
is higher by more than the interest on the additional debt on that path,
the country gains from the moratorium, Corresponding to the lower







creditor countries, ultimately to the stock—holders of the creditor
banks. The burden of adjustment on path A is greater than that on B,
although both eventually lead to a restoration of growth. Eventual
return to growth does not imply the success of a debt strategy. Quite
possibly there were alternatives that would have resulted in higher
levels of income or consumption in the debtor countries throughout.9
The failure of the fifteen heavily indebted countries to restore
consistent growth since 1982 has to be weighed in the balance in
evaluating the debt strategy followed so far.
A major issue that has to be discussed in evaluating different
debt strategies is whether the growth rate of real GNP for the debtor
countries is the same on paths with deeper adjustment such as A, and
paths with less adjustment such as B. If a moratorium or any policy
other than full debt servicing reduces market access, it could also slow
growth. If so, the relevant choice in Figure 1 would not be between A
and B, but between A and C, where C's low growth rate results from
sanctions, explicit or implicit, that are imposed as a result of the
failure to meet debt obligations in full, or by the incomplete
adjustment of the economy to its new circumstances.
Before describing and evaluating plans to solve the debt
problem, I make several stipulations about the nature of the problem and
its solution.
8A simple criterion by which to judge alternative strategies from the
viewpoint of the debtors is the present discounted value of their
consumption.11
First, the debt crisis will have to be resolved in a way that
differentiates among countries. Bolivia's problem is different from
Brazil's, and both are different from Tanzania's.
Second, from the viewpoint of the stability of the U.S. banking
system, the debt problem is dominated by just a few countries——over half
of total U.S. banks' liabilities, and the liabilities of the nine money
center banks, are in Mexico, Brazil and Venezuela. The concentration on
the Baker fifteen with its heavily Latin American flavor is a result of
those countries' debts being predominantly to the private sector.
Similarly, the concentration is this paper is on private sector capital
flows and debts.
• Third, concentration on the Baker fifteen overlooks the debt and
growth problems of sub-Saharan Africa, which will have to be taken into
account in any discussion of aid.
Fourth, just as the debt problem arrived unexpectedly as a result of
changes in the international economy, it could quietly go away.Higher
prices for commodity exports, and further reductions in real interest
rates, would make the entire problem look manageable. It could also
intensify quickly if the international trading system seizes up as a
result of growing protectionism.
• Fifth, the interested parties, the banks and the debtors, each have
little interest in revealing the dimensions of whatever compromises they
might ultimately be willing to make.12
Finally, there are important political constraints on solutions to the
debt problem. There is no well—defined economic sense in which a
Brazil, Mexico or Argentina is incapable of servicing and ultimately
paying off its debt.9 In none of these countries is the external debt
to GNP ratio much more than 60%. Given long enough, and given a
government powerful enough to reduce living standards sufficiently,'°
those countries would be capable of generating the trade surpluses that
would enable them to regain normal access to the capital markets.
However the new democratic governments in several of the heavily
indebted countries are certainly too weak to achieve massive reductions
in consumption. The question for both their own governments and the
creditor governments is how far it is possible and politically wise to
push their citizens to meet debt payments.
9See Feldstein C1986) for a detailed scenario.
'°Of course it becomes harder for the debtors to meet their obligation
if the creditor governments close markets to foreigners.13
II. Procedural Reform and New Debt Instruments.
Some debt plans would leave the present value of claimson the
debtors unchanged while changing their form. Others wouldreduce the
present value of claims on the debtors. Many of the proposals fornew
debt instruments are intended to maintain thepresent value of claims on
the debtors while making it easier for them topay, by adapting
repayments schedules to the likely patterns of debtor foreignexchange
receipts.
In this section I take up both procedural andregulatory reforms
that could improve the bargaining process by which debt dealsare
reached and reduce obstacles to capital inflows to thedebtors, and
suggestions for new debt instruments. In neither case is thechange
designed to reduce the value of claims on the debtors.
Procedural Reform.
Several procedural reforms are listed in Table 3. There has
already been progress in the implementation of a number of these
reforms, including the first.The frequency of complicated debt
negotiations has been a significant burden on the economicmanagement
teams of debtor nations. Because macroeconomicmanagement skills are in
short suppply, reduction of the frequency of suchnegotatiations would
Table 3: PROCEDURAL REFORMS.
Change Initiating agency.
1. Multiyear rescheduling. Banks and debtors.14
2. Reduced size of banking syndic— Banks and debtors.
ates and exit option for small banks.
3. Change accounting rules to allow Bank examiners and accounting
partial iritedowns and their standards.
gradual amortization.
4. U.s. information provision on for—Bank regulators and IRS.
eign accounts.
5. U.s. taxation of foreign accounts.Congress.
help improve the overall quality of macroeconomic management. Although
the creditor banks value the short leash that more frequent negotiations
provide, they can retain some of that control by using IMF Article IV
consultations as a framework of evaluation of the country's economic
progress and as a condition for further disbursement of funds.
Multiyear restructurings of the debt are becoming routine, for example
for Mexico, Argentina and the Philippines, and there appears to be no
objection in principle to such agreements on the part of the banks.
The size of the banking syndicates involved in the debt
negotiations and the need for hundreds of banks to agree to packages
that have already been negotiated are obstacles both to efficient
negotiation and to the rapid mobilization of capital after an agreement15
has been reached. After the September 1986 Mexican agreement it took
nearly six months for all 500 banks to sign on. The desire of many of
the small banks to leave the international debt business is well known.
The exit vehicle may be either the interbank secondary markets or as in
the 1987 Argentinian restructuring, special provisions to enable the
small banks to leave the syndicates. For instance, it should be in the
interests of both the large creditor banks and the debtor countries to
agree to allow banks that collectively hold the last 3—5% of the debt to
leave the syndicate. This could be achieved by the debtor selling them
exit bonds that pay interest at a rate below the market rate, with an
economic present value above the secondary market price of the country's
debt but a face value equal to that of the original debt. Alternatively
they might be allowed to leave the syndicate if they sell their claims
in the secondary market.1' In order to provide an exit vehicle for the
smaller banks, it woul&also be necessary for the larger banks and the
debtors to agree that sales of securities or purchases of long—term
bonds of the debtors free the bank from the obligation to participate in
future funding.
Two aspects of the accounting and tax treatment of sales of debt
at less than face value have to be distinguished. First, it is unclear
whether a bank selling part of its claims on a given country for less
than book value has to write down its remaining claims to the same
extent. That is a problem for those banks wishing to sell off part of
their debts but not all, and presumably is not the main concern of the
''Obviously this would apply only to banks holding the last 3-5% of the
country's debt as of a given exit date.16
smaller banks that wish to leave the international debt business.
Second, any bank taking a loss in a given period has to record that as a
loss in current revenue and cannot amortize it over time.
To start with the second problem: it is not obvious that the
value of a firm's stock is increased by amortizing a recognized loss
over a prolonged period, Certainly markets responded well to the
creation of large loss reserves by the leading banks in May and June of
1987, apparently placing a positive value on the explicit recognition of
the possible loss. If nonetheless banks were convinced that
amortization was preferable to a larger one—time loss, they could be
allowed to write off the losses over a period of several years rather
than immediately.
Uncertainty arises over the accounting treatment of debt whose
market value is below face value when some of that debt is sold. One
view is that banks have to write down the value of all the remaining
debt of that type on their balance sheets. That would seem to be the
rationale for banks' attempts to swap debt among themselves rather than
buy and sell in the secondary market. However, some bankers believe
that it is not necessary to write down all the debt of a given country
if some of that debt is sold in the market——so long as a good case can
be made that the bank is likely to collect on the remaining debt.12
Certainly the creation of loss reserves against developing country debt
has not forced the banks to carry the corresponding debt on their
balance sheets at its market value.
12This was the position taken by a panel of the American Institute of
CPA's in 1985 (See "The Outlook" column, Wall Street Journal, October 26
1986)17
The basic source of the accounting difficulties, if they exist,
stems from the fact that debt is carried at more than market value in
the first place. If for some reason it is appropriate to carry that
debt at market value so long as it has not been sold, then the
regulators should not have any difficulty allowing those parts of the
debt that have not been sold to continue to be carried on the same basis
as before.
Although some capital flight can be regarded as a natural
attempt by portfolio-holders in developing countries to diversify
internationally, much of it is a form of tax evasion. Procedural
reforms 4 and S would help the debtors deal with the tax—evasion aspects
of capital flight. U.S. and foreign developed country banks that hold
the accounts of citizens of other countries could be required to inform
the tax authorities of those countries of the existence of the accounts.
It is probably at present difficult to trace the home country of some
depositors, but it should not be difficult to find a method of requiring
those opening new accounts to give some proof of country of residence.
This provision would have to be agreed with other countries, and thus
would take time to implement.
The United States could more easily impose a uniform tax on all
interest on bank accounts, and indeed on other income generated from
securities holdings, that are not those of United States taxpayers.
Once again the effectiveness of such measures would depend on
cooperation in introducing similar measures in other countries. By
taxing the accounts itself, the U.S. government would be reducing the18
attraction of capital flight. An alternative would be for the taxes to
be imposed by the country from which the capital fled, for which purpose
the provision of better information about foreign—held bank accounts
would assist the tax authorities in the debtor countries- Here too an
international agreement would be needed if countries were not to compete
for foreign capital by favorable tax treatment, as they do at present.
Changing the Nature of Claims.
Many of the suggestions for dealing with the debt crisis involve
changes in the nature of the claims on the debtors. The driving force
behind these suggestions is the conclusion that the structure of the
debt in 1982 was partly responsible for the debt crisis. With virtually
all payment flows linked to short term interest rates abroad, the
debtors were vulnerable to a rise in real interest rates in the19
Table 4: CHANGING THE NATURE OF CLAIMS.
Change Initiating Agency.
1. Development of secondary and Creditor financial ins—
insurance markets. titutions and official
institutions
2. Indexed loans Debtors and banks
3. Contingent lending obligations Debtors, banks and
offical lenders.
4. Longer maturity debts. Debtors and banks
5. Debt—equity swaps Debtors and banks
6. Servicing of debt in Debtors and banks
local currency.
7. Return of flight capital Creditor and debtor
governments, and banks.
8. Country funds. Debtors and creditor
financial intermediaries
9. Debt subordination. Debtors, existing and
new lenders.
10. Interest capitalization. Debtors and banks, plus
creditor governments.
developed countries, and had no protection against changes in the terms
of trade. These suggestions are probably motivated also by the view
that eventually the structure of debtor country liabilities should
correspond more closely to the structure of underlying assets, and
should have more long—term fixed interest debt, more equity, more direct
investment, and less floating rate debt.13 These arrangements would
'3Lessard and Williamson (1985) provide a very useful review of
alternative proposals for changing the form of finance of the debtor
countries. See also World Development Report, 1985, and World Economic
Outlook, April 1986.20
provide for more risk—sharing between lenders and borrowers than
floating rate debt was expected to produce.'4
The term securitizatjon is often used to describe a process in
which existing debt is taken off the books of the banks and turned into
securities, for instance through sale in the secondary market. The same
term can be used to describe potential changes in future private sector
financing of economic development, with the maturity and nature of the
securities reflecting the underlying investments.
Secondary and insurance markets: It is often suggested that the
development of secondary markets would help solve the debt crisis.
Secondary markets have already developed to some extent, though trading
in those markets is thin. Citibank's intention to use the secondary
markets more intensively, announced in Nay 1987 in conjunction with the
increase in its loss reserves, could increase the depth of those
markets. Regulatory restrictions discouraging partial sales by the
banks, or at least uncertainties about accounting and regulatory
treatment of the sales, would have to be removed for these markets to
develop.
The secondary market does little to solve the debt crisis other
than to enable the banks——if they were to sell their claims——to reduce
their vulnerability to default in particular countries. Banks have also
engaged in debt swaps to strengthen their balance sheets, sometimes in
conjunction with debt—equity swaps. The secondary market could
eventually become the locus in which an international facility deals
'41n the event, though, creditors have to some extent shared in the
losses that higher interest rates imposed on borrowers.21
with the debt. And, if the market became deeper, prices in it could
serve as the basis for debt renegotiation.
Private insurance of the debt is not in principle different from
the provision of a secondary market, except that it would enable banks
tied into the debt to reduce their vulnerability to default.'5
Insurance rates could be deduced from the discounts on debt in the
secondary market, and would be extremely high for many countries. The
public sector in the form of the Fed has implicitly been providing
insurance to the banking system since the start of the debt crisis, but
because it is not obligated to come to the rescue of any particular
bank, private insurance if it were available would remove uncertainty
for creditor banks. Because the debt crisis and discounts on debt are
so deep, it is difficult to see private insurance markets becoming
large, or contributing significantly to a solution of the current debt
crisis. But the emergence of such markets could facilitate future debt
flows to developing countries.
There have also been proposals for public sector provision of
insurance in the form of a MIGA (multilateral investment guarantee
authority) perhaps spearheaded by the World Bank.16 Such an authority
could help mobilize new private capital, perhaps at lower cost than
through private insurance because the World Bank and other multilateral
agencies have developed expertise in evaluating loans to developing
countries. The MIGA need not necessarily subsidize the insurance rates;
151n this paragraph I discuss insurance of existing debt obligations.
'6National export credit agencies perform some of the same functions.
The World Bank has provided some investment guarantees in co—financing
of projects with commercial lenders.22
if it were to do so, the organizing agency would have to decide if that
was the most productive use of its subsidies rather than, for instance,
providing them in the form of lower cost loans to the borrowers. The
provision of 100% insurance by MIGA would create the type of moral
hazard problem of inadequate monitoring of loans by lenders that
contributed to the creation of the current debt crisis; I4IGA would
therefore probably insist on significant levels of co—insurance with the
lenders.
Indexed loans: Any loan that ties payments from debtors to creditors to
some objective criterion is an indexed loan. There are different
motivations for such instruments. A proposal that countries should pay
real interest on their debts, which would mean say 2-3% real, could
imply a cash flow that starts out small and ends with a balloon payment
at maturity when the inflation adjustment component is added to
principal. But indexation of. interest could also imply that the
interest due in a given year is 2—3% plus that year's rate of inflation.
The proposal to fix the real interest rate on the international debt was
made with the aim of reducing short—term resource flows from the debtor
countries, both by re4ucing the real rate below the extremely high
levels implicit in then nominal rates, and in delaying some repayments
until maturity. A reduction in the real rate would of course reduce the
resource transfer from the developing countries. But given the
possibility of supply shocks, debtors with real obligations could find
themselves having to make high real transfers precisely when world trade
and their export earnings are depressed. Of course, if the country is23
the beneficiary of the supply shock——for instance the oil exporters
during the first and second oil shocks——then the indexation helps it
match its payments stream to its ability to pay. Similarly, if high
inflation is caused by expansionary demand policies in the developed
countries that raise commodity prices, indexation would create a closer
match between the countries' liabilities and its ability to pay.
Exchange participation notes suggested by Bailey (1983) tie
payments to export earnings.17 In a crude way Peru has instituted such
notes by paying interest only up to a certain percentage of its export
earnings. However creditors have not relinquished their unmet claims on
Peru, whereas agreed upon exchange earnings indexation could simply
define the claim as a certain share of export earnings. In well-
operating markets such claims could be priced and traded, and there is
no difficulty in principle in envisaging their introduction.
Two objections to the indexation of interest payments to export
earnings have emerged. First, if interest payments are indexed to
export earnings——for instance that a country pays 20% of its foreign
exchange earnings in interest——then that is like a tax on exports
earnings, which discourages the country from exporting. Rather, it is
argued, index the payments to a larger total, such as GNP, which would
permit a lower "tax" rate and therefore a smaller disincentive effect.
While the tax argument is correct (though its quantitative significance
remains uncertain) ,itis not decisive: first, a country with export
earnings has the foreign exchange to make payments to foreign creditors,
'7Lessard and Williamson (1985) analyze this and related proposals which
they call "quasi—equity" investments.24
whereas a country whose GNP is growing while its exports are not may
not; second. the indexation of interest payments provides an incentive
for the creditor governments not to restrict imports from the debtors,
for in so doing they reduce the interest earned by their own banks.
The second objection to indexation of interest is that the bank
regulators would have great difficulty handling the valuation of these
quasit—equity claims and might forbid the banks from holding them.
Other financial intermediaries, such as pension funds, might be willing
to hold exchange participation notes. Further, debtor countries could
attempt to sell such instruments as bonds. Oil—price indexed bonds have
already been sold by both Mexico and a private company18 and are an
obvious indexed instrument that the oil exporters would presumably be
willing to supply and for which a hedging demand in the developed
countries is likely to exist.
It is sometimes suggested that the debtors would be unhappy to
allow the payments on indexed notes or bonds to rise very high in the
event the country suffers a bout of good luck. There is aflin no
problem in principle for the capital markets to price indexed
instruments with ceilings on payments. Of course the sellers of the
bond pay a price for imposing the ceiling, but it may be a price they
are willing to pay.
Direct swaps of debt for claims on commodities which the
recipient exports are another form of indexed instrument. By tieing the
'°Both Mexico and Petro—Lewis suffered subsequent reverses, and the
Mexican oil bonds are not regarded as a success; Petro—1ewis's problems
appear unrelated to the issue of indexed bonds.25
payoff of loans to a specific amount of the country's production, such
agreements reduce the transfer problem.19
Contingent lending obligations: Contingent lending obligations are
another variant of this type of proposal. Examples are the IMF's
Compensatory Financing Facility and the 1986 agreement that Mexico will
receive additional loans if oil prices fall. In all cases of contingent
financing and interest payments the benefit for the recipient country is
the assurance that it will automatically rather than after protracted
negotiation receive financing in the event of need; the problem for the
lender is the fear that good money may be thrown after bad. That can to
some extent be compensated for by a higher interest rate, but higher
interest rates increase the probability of default, which is the cause
of rationing in credit markets.
Longer debt maturities: Moving on to item 4 in Table 4, debt maturities
are already quite long, from six to as much as twenty years, in many
debt agreements. The long maturities protect the borrowers from having
to roll over the debt frequently, but because the loans are at floating
rates still leave them vulnerable to interest rate shocks. From the
viewpoint of the banks, the lengthening of maturities is a lengthening
of the rein on which the debtor countries are held——as indeed are other
proposals in Table 4 including indexed instruments——and therefore comes
at a price.
'91n conversation Pentti ICouri has argued that the fact that Finnish
reparations to the Soviet Union after World War II were specified in
physical terms made the transfer of resources less burdensome than it
would otherwise have been.26
Debt—equity swaps: Debt—equity swaps are the central element of most
market—oriented debt restructurings, and they have also been
implemented, for example in Mexico, Chile and Argentina. The essential
transaction is simply that a debt claim on a country is swapped by that
country's central bank for local currency claims that should be invested
in local firms.
If the domestic equity markets were working well, if there were
no constraints on purchases of foreign exchange or domestic assets, and
if there were no subsidies involved, such transactions would not attract
any attention. But they do. The greatest attraction for the creditors
is that debt—equity swaps often carry an implicit subsidy of the equity
investment. Swaps may involve the purchase of debt in the secondary
market at a discount, and redemption at face value. With secondary
market discounts that even for the major debtors may be as high as 50%,
the subsidy element can be very large.
However there is no inherent reason the debtor country has to
subsidize the transaction to the extent set by the New York market price
of the debt. If it wants to subsidize the transaction, it can do so by
setting a price at which debt can be redeemed prematurely, at a level
between the New York price and face value. Another approach has been
used by Chile, which auctions off the right to exchange dollar debt for
peso assets.
Obviously debt—equity swaps replace interest payments by
dividend payments, and are not a source of new money for the debtor
country. In addition, they may merely be subsidies for investment flows29
Flight capital: The return of flight capital is another item that has
received considerable attention. Here the amounts involved may be
large, of the order of half the Argentinian and Mexican debts. Some
debt—equity swaps probably represent the return of flight capital.
Provided the subsidy element is kept small, this may be a useful vehicle
for the return of flight capital. Similarly any measures the regulatory
authorities in the developed countries are willing to take to enable
countries to trace this capital would help the debtor governments tax
it, and perhaps help bring it home.
The main advantage of flight capital over alternative sources of
funding that might be available at lower rates is that it prevents the
sale of the national patrimony to foreigners. (Meltzer, 1983) Flight
capital might also be a preferable source of financing of domestic
business because the local owners of flight capital have more
specialized knowledge of local markets.
However it would be difficult to place flight capital as the
centerpiece of any debt strategy. If it would come back for reasonable
interest rates and small subsidization of debt—equity deals, it would
not need any special attention. It is quite likely though that
especially high rates of return would be needed, because the owners of
flight capital would fear the imposition of ex post sanctions of some
type.21
21The government of Turkey obtains funds from expatriate workers by
borrowing in Germany at 3% above the Eurodollar rate.(See Rodrik
(1987) for details) .Presumablydebtor countries could set up similar
schemes in foreign countries for capital held there. It might however
be difficult for the government to justify paying higher interest to
citizens who had invested abroad than to those who had kept their funds
at home.30
Flight capital left some countries, such as Argentina,
completely legally. It left others that had exchange controls
illegally. The possibility exists of providing an amnesty for the
return of flight capital to those countries it left illegally,though
here as with other aspects of the debt crisis, the fear ofsetting
precedents would affect policy decisions.
Mutual funds: Mutual fund investment in developing countries, the
"Country X Fund'1 is a potential source of equity capital that would
succeed in attracting some new capital, and help in the aim ofchanging
the form of foreign investment in the debtor countries. The amounts
involved here are however likely to be small initially. Such mutual
funds would do more to encourage future capital flows to thedeveloping
countries than to deal with the existing debt problem.
Debt subordination: Another suggestion to encourage new capital inflows
is that existing debt claims be subordinated so that new lendersgo to
the front of the repayment line. Subordination ispresumably ruled out
without the permission of the existing lenders. If it were likely that
substantial new capital could be tapped through subordination, the
existing lenders could see an increase in the probability of their being
repaid, and might be willing to agree. Rowever with no obvioussources
of new capital available, they are unlikely to do so.
Interest capitalization: The last item in Table 4, interest
capitalization, could change resource transfers to the debtors quite
radically and rapidly. Capitalization simply limits the amount of
interest that has to be paid in any one year, perhaps to a given nominal31
interest rate on the debt, or to a given percentage of GNP, a given
percentage of export earnings, or by some formula related to commodity
prices. Whatever the criterion for the amount to be transferred in the
given year, the remainder is capitalized and automatically added to the
debt, to be paid off over a specified horizon.
Interest capitalization has the attraction of dealing very
directly with the problem that current transfers from the debtors are so
large as to inhibit growth. the obvious fear from the viewpoint of the
creditors is that the process is unstable, that the amounts capitalized
will grow too fast for the country ever to be able to pay all the
interest without further capitalization. Whether that is a realistic
fear depends entirely on the growth prospects of the country and the
exact formula used for capitalization. But if every reasonable
capitalization formula results in debt instability, then there is
presumably no chance that current claims on the country can be collected
in full. That is, interest capitalization is a simple substitute for
rescheduling when the problem is liquidity, but not when it is solvency.
Table S presents calculations of the hypothetical path of the
indebtedness of the fifteen heavily indebted countries under the
assumption that interest capping began with the onset of the debt crisis
in 1982 and continued to 1987. According to the real interest rate
formula, the hypothetical payment from debtors to creditors each year
was 3% plus the rate of inflation of the U.S. GNP deflator. According
to the share of exports formula, the debtors made interest payments of
25% of their exports.22 In each case it is assumed that the interest
22The 3% real interest rate and the 25% share of interest earnings were
chosen to ensure that the hypothetical debt in 1987 was similar to the
actual debt in 1987.32
rate at which interest is accumulated is the average actual interest
rate paid on the debt in that year. It is further assumed that the only
capital inflows to the fifteen heavily indebted countries resulted from
interest capping.
Table 5: RESULTS OF HYPOTHETICAL INTEREST CAPITALIZATION.
Outstanding Debt ($ bill)
Formula
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
Actual 383.].394.2 410.9417.2434.2464.9
3% real interest 383.1392.6 409.8427.3 443.9451.5
25% of exports 383.1400.7 414.4429.6443.8457.4
Source: Underlying data are from World Economic Outlook, April 1987,
Statistical Appendix.
The calculations in Table S show that interest capping based on
a 3% real interest rate would have produced a very similar pattern of
capital inflows to the actual pattern——but it would have been produced
automatically without the constant negotiation that has marked the
period since 1982. The main difference between the first two rows of
the table occurs in 1985, when capital inflows would have been
substantially larger with a 3% interest rate cap, and in 1987 (for which
the "actual" is in any event hypothetical) when the inflow would have
been reduced. Interest capping under a formula that fixed actual
payments at 25% of exports would have produced a larger inflow of
capital in 1983 at the start of the crisis.33
The assumption in Table S is that exports and the interest rate
at which interest is accumulated would have been the same under interest
capping as actually occurred. It might be pointed out that with a 25%
"tax" on earnings, exports would have been lower. That is possible, but
note that actual interest is merely deferred by the capping, not
forgiven. It is also possible that the dynamics of negotiation and thus
the interest rate at which interest would have accrued would have been
different under interest capping. However there is no presumption as to
the direction of that effect.
The calculations presented in Table S may thus be taken as
indicative of the pattern that would have been seen under interest
capping. The most interesting result in the table is that capping at a
3% real interest rate would have had only a small effect on the pattern
of debt accumulation, and is thus a less radical proposal than it
sounds.
Interest capitalization has received more support in Europe than
in the U.S. Capitalization maintains the banks' claims on the debtors,
producing the prospect of eventual repayment, and would thus be
preferred by the lenders to interest forgiveness. However it may suffer
fran accounting difficulties in the United States, with the issue being
whether the debt has to be treated as non—performing when capitalization
is triggered. Here U.S. regulators would have to change rules if
capitalization were to became a practical option.34
It has also been argued that capitalization is an unstable
process because once introduced, it leads inevitably to the demand for
more: if the first agreement is to capitalize 40% of interest, won't the
debtor demand 60% next time, and so on. It is hard to see why the
normal bargaining process is more unstable in this direction than in any
other. Besides, agreements will almost certainly include an extra
charge for the use of the capitalization feature.
As with the other types of change in the form of claims on the
debtor countries, interest capitalization may be useful for some
countries, in this case those clearly in temporary difficulties. The
alternative of a rescheduling suffers the need to engage in a more
complicated negotiation, which may bog down over the desire of the
smaller banks to escape. But the reschedulings achieve some of the
goals of interest capitalization in reducing immediate outward resource
transfers from the debtors by providing a grace period before principal
repayment is to resume.
Most of the proposals discussed in this section are for changes
in the form of the debt, that——except to some extent in the discussion
ofdebt—equity swaps——do not reduce the present value of debtor country
obligations. Alternative proposals do typically includeelements of
debtrelief.
III.New Institutions.
The overhang of the existing debt is the main obstacle to a
renewal of resource inflows to the heavily indebted developing
countries. Very early in the debt crisis both Kenen (1983) and Rohatyn
(1983) proposed the formation of an international institution to buy35
debt at a price below the face value and provide relief to the debtor
countries. Similar proposals have beenmade later, most recently in the
1987 U.S. trade bill.
Kenen's 1983 proposal was for the governments of the creditor
nations to set up an International Debt Discount Corporation (IDDC) to
which they would contribute capital. The IDDC would issue long—term
bonds to the banks in exchange f or their developing country debts, at a
discount. In 1983 Kenen suggested 90 cents on the dollar. It would in
turn collect from the debtor countries, using some of the 10 cents to
provide debt relief. If the IDDC misjudged and was unable to collect,
the creditor governments would bear the losses.
The plan is elegantly simple in replacing developing country
debt in banks' balance sheets with the liabilities of the IDDC, in
effect requiring the banks to lend to the IDDC. Kenen proposed that the
banks not be allowed to choose which debt they would sell, and that the
debtor countries would have to agree that the IDDC was the successor
debt holder. The IDDC could lengthen the maturity of the debt. He
proposed only a modest discount, of about 10%, on the debt; given the
persistence of high interest rates and low commodity prices since 1983,
and the large discounts in the secondary market, he would presumably
currently suggest a larger discount.
Rohatyn suggested the setting up of an institution that would
obtain resources by borrowing in the market, and from the creditor
governments. It would then buy debt from the banks, at a discount, and
pass the discount on to the debtor nations. He envisaged sufficient36
discounts to bring debt service burdens down to 25-30% of exports; they
are currently 50% for the heavily indebted countries.
Weinert (1986—87) proposes that the World Bank and/or developed
country governments buy the debt from the banks in exchange for low—
interest loans. Suppose that the debt relief is organized through an
IDDC. The IDDC passes the same low interest rate on to the debtors.
The interest rate is calculated so that the market value of IDDC bonds
exchanged for a given country's debt is equal to the secondary market
value of that country's debts. But because the face value is the same
as that on the debts bought from the banks, the banks can in effect
amortize their capital loss through lower profits over the life of the
bonds.
Weinert assumes the operation can be carried out without
government funds. Some source of capital, presumably governmental,
would be needed in any case. Whether the governments retrieve their
capital depends on whether the debtors succeed in paying off their
reduced obligations. Possibly the creditor governments or the World
Bank might decide that aid could be injected to reduce the burden of the
debt on the debtors even beyond that implied by the purchase of the debt
at secondary market prices.
There are several questions about IDDC type schemes. First, why
would the banks agree, and would they all have to agree? At the right
price, the banks collectively might agree to a scheme of this sort on
the grounds that it transforms uncertain debt into more certain or
perhaps even government guaranteed debt. -37
The key operational issues in the setting up of an IDDC are the
prices at which the IDDC buys debt from the banks, and the amount of
relief it provides to the debtors. Unless the debt were auctioned off,
it would be difficult to come up with the right price. Once the IDDC
became a serious possibility, the secondary market price would reflect
expectations about IDDC operations, and would not necessarily serve as
an accurate indicator of value. But even though there appears at
present to be little prospect of such an institution, the secondary
market is thin and prices in it cannot be used as good indicators of the
market value that would exist if the regulatory environment made it
possible for the large banks to use that market freely.
flow much debt would be offered by the banks? If the TDDC
offered a high enough interest rate it would get all the banks to
participate. At a sufficiently low interest rate no banks would take
part. The IDDC could not force the banks to accept the offer unless
perhaps it reached an agreement with the banking syndicate for each
country. Unless there is some contribution of public money, the plan
gets stuck if the banks will not buy debt at an interest rate that looks
reasonable for the given country, or some other means is found of
ensuring bank participation
Any IDDC type scheme creates a freerider problem. If the IDDC
buys up much of the developing country debt and makes some form of debt
relief possible, then the credit standing of the debtors improves.
Those creditors who stayed out of the IDDC agreement have a capital
gain. For that reason an IDDC would have to find some means of ensuring
almost complete participation by the creditors.38
If it does not use secondary market prices, how would the IDOC
proceed? It would have to calculate for each country the interest rate
it regards as right for that country, and then offer to exchange debt at
that interest rate with the banks.There is no ready objective basis
for calculating how much each country can afford to pay, or shouldpay.
This will be an issue in all debt relief schemes, and will have to be
settled on the basis of some combination of the country's per capita
income level and the losses it has suffered in the debt crisis.23
Recently the Japanese commercial banks have, with government
blessing, set up an intermediary to buy their holdings of developing
country debt. The Japanese banks derive tax benefits from the sale of
their assets at a discount. The U.S. tax laws appear not to afford the
same advantages to U.S. banks taking discounts. The Japanese
intermediary does not of course plan to forgive any of the developing
country debt. But it does provide a precedent for half of the
transaction an IDDC would undertake
The IDDC notion is at the least interesting; if it could be
carried off with relatively small injections of public money it would
also be important. The key questions about each such plan are how large
a writedown the banks take, whether they would be willing, or could be
made willing, to do so, and how much relief is provided to the debtors.
If there is to be an overall solution to the debt problem it will almost
23Sachs (1986) suggests per capita income declines since the start of
the debt crisis as the basis for relief. This could give large amounts
of relief to the relatively rich borrowers. Since the provision of debt
relief through public funds is in part a result of a sense of fairness,
it is likely that relief would be based on the level of per capita
income as well as (perhaps) debt—related indicators.39
certainly involve an IDDC type institution. But since the procedures it
sets up for pricing debt will determine the burdens borne by both banks
and debtors, and the possible extent of creditor nation government
support, its operating rules and management are bound to be the subject
of protracted negotiations. It might be possible in such a negotiation
to separate technical discussions on the terms and methods of buying
debt from aid discussions that determine the concessions that are given
to each country.
One way to move ahead systematically on the debt issue is for
the creditor and debtor countries to agree to exploratory talks on the
setting up of such an institution.
IV. Debt Relief.
Debt relief could be given in the context of an IDDC. The case
for relief is that debtor countries will be unable to grow unless they
can increase imports, that no solution currently in sight permits them
to do that without reducing income levels to politically unacceptable
levels, and that ultimately they will in any case not pay most of their
debts. If debt relief were not necessary, the creditor banks and
debtors would already have got together on a plan, such as interest
capitalization, that permits the resumption of growth while promising
that the debt will eventually be paid off.
The case against debt relief is that of precedent, and the view
that contracts that were voluntarily entered into should not be
abrogated. The question of the precedent that would be set by giving40
debt relief is not simple. As Lindert and Norton (1987) point out,
defaults have occurred quite regularly in the past, but that precedent
has not made any of the major debtors default this time. Further, debt
contracts involve both creditors and debtors, and the use of political
authority to enforce the debts sets a precedent for creditors, whose
incentives to exercise appropriate caution in lending are reduced.
Relief can come through direct negotiations between the creditor
banks and each debtor country, or with the intervention of the
international institutions and/or creditor governments. Or it may be
imposed unilaterally by some of the debtor governments, either in the
form of a moratorium which does not repudiate the debt, or in the form
of unilateral action that leaves them to deal with the legal
consequences of their actions. Or it could come in some combination of
the above.
Negotiations between debtors and their creditor banks would not
be direct unless the creditor governments and international institutions
kept out. A negotiation in which a creditor government warns the debtor
that any failure to pay 100% of the debt will affect political and aid
relations is multilateral, not direct. In any direct negotiation the
debtor nonetheless would have to weigh the legal and other consequences
of not paying in full (Kaletsky, 1985). If it can meaningfully threaten
that, it should be able to reach an agreement that provides some relief.
Presumably the largest debtors, such as Brazil and Mexico, would
have the negotiating power to reach an actual agreement on relief. The
smaller debtors are in a weaker position with regard to reaching an41
agreement, although the case of Peru suggests the smaller countries may
find it easier to set unilateral terms on which there is no formal
agreement with the creditors.The most likely scenario in which
smaller countries obtain agreed—upon relief in direct negotiations is
that they reach agreements patterned on those of the larger debtors.
Indeed, one of the fears of the creditor banks is that any concessions
extended to one country will have automatically to be extended to
others.
It might be possible for the major debtors to settle their own
debt problems in direct negotiations. As in any real world bargaining
situation, the outcome would be determined by the threats that each side
could realistically make (Bulow and Shoven, 1986). Since neither
debtors nor creditors can be sure of the consequences of default, the
results of such bargaining are difficult to foresee. So long as the
creditor countries permitted these negotiations to proceed without
interference, and at critical stages were willing to help——for instance
by changing banking regulations—-agreement is quite possible. The
agreement would likely be conditional on the countrys economic
policies, and could involve the international institutions in monitoring
roles.
However the free rider problem among creditor banks is not
trivial. If an overall agreement is reached in which creditor banks
make concessions that help restore the debtor's growth, individual banks
have the incentive to stay out to try to collect 100% of their debt. In
the United States at least it appears to be extremely difficult to42
prevent this type of action, even by law, since the rights of the banks
may be constitutionally protected.
Proposals to require relief, for instance by interest rate
capping, or by debt forgiveness imposed by law, would likely also run
into legal obstacles in the United States if not elsewhere. It night be
possible to make relief more attractive to the creditors by providing
further aid for the debtors, most likely in an IDDC context.
V. Scenarios.
Three basic scenarios can be seen. The first is an evolution of
the muddling through strategy that has been followed to date. The basic
element in the strategy is the negotiation of agreements from time to
time between each country and its private creditors, with interest rates
being set on a floating rate basis at some markup over LIBOR. The
evolution would take place as new assets (such as oil—price indexed
bonds, and exit bonds) were introduced, as banks swapped claims with
each other and with the debtors (debt—equity swaps for example), and as
the margins and fees on the existing debt change through negotiation.
This is the very much the mixture as before.
Its benefits were noted in the introduction: there has not been
a world financial crisis, the banks have had time to improve their
balance sheets, real interest rates have fallen, and possibly the world
economic situation will become more favorable for the debtors. The
difficulties with this strategy were also noted in the introduction:
growth has been slow or negative in the debtor countries and the crisis43
shows no signs of disappearing. If anything, debt negotiations appear
to have become more rather than less difficult since 1982.
The second scenario would see a series of direct agreements
between each debtor and its creditors, involving relief and substantial
lengthening of the debt. The negotiations for such agreements would be
protracted and possibly crisis—laden, and would likely involve the
international institutions in monitoring roles. The benefit of such a
solution is that it is a longer—term solution, which enables debtors to
concentrate on domestic economic management, and gives creditors an
opportunity to put their balance sheets in order. The chances of
reaching such agreements may well have been enhanced by the creation of
loss reserves by the creditor banks.
The third possibility is the setting up of a large international
organization, the IDDC, to attempt to dispose of the debt problem. This
too has the benefits of settling the crisis and enabling economic
management teams to concentrate on policies for growth. It would also
provide a longer-term solution for the banks. Such a scheme would
likely require a net contribution of resources from creditor governments
or the international institutions, and the political difficulties of
reaching agreed upon formulae for debt relief would be formidable.
Of course, the scenarios are not mutually exclusive. The second
and third possibilities could be combined, with the debt crisis
eventally being resolved through a.mixture of direct agreements between
creditors and detbors with extra relief being provided for the most
impoverished countries though an IDDC or the existing international44
institutions. Elements of the first scenario would be seen in the
evolution of international lending in the direction of more equity—like
claims. In all cases the solutions would involve agreedupon policy
reforms in the debtor countries to attempt to ensure that the debt
problem does not soon recur.REFERENCES
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